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Recent Cases

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MARYLAND UPHOLDS
STATUTE PROHIBITING "BLOCKBUSTING"
WHETHER OR NOT ENGAGED IN
FOR MONETARY GAIN

State v. Wagner, 291 A.2d 161 (Md. 1972)

In State v. Wagner,' the Court of Special Appeals 2 of Maryland upheld the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting
"blockbusting" statements, whether or not such statements were
made for monetary gain.3 The court held that, as long as the state1. 291 A.2d 161 (Md. 1972).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 130 (1966) provides that the Court of
Special Appeals is an intermediate court of appeal with jurisdiction over
direct appeals from the circuit courts of the counties and from the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in all criminal cases where the sentence is
other than death, subject in each case to a further appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1957) prohibits "blockbusting" by providing as follows:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, whether or not acting for monetary gain, knowingly to
induce or attempt to induce another person to transfer an interest
in real property, or to discourage another person from purchasing
real property, by representations regarding the existing or potential proximity of real property owned, used, or occupied by persons of any particular race, color, religion, or national origin, or to
represent that such existing or potential proximity will or may
result in: 1. the lowering of property values; 2. a change in the
racial, religious, or ethnic character of the block, neighborhood, or
area in which the property is located; 3. an increase in criminal or
antisocial behavior in the area; or 4. a decline in quality of the
schools serving the area (emphasis added).
For provisions similar to those found in the Maryland statute, see
OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H) (9) (Page 1969); Wis. STAT. § 101.60(2m)
(Supp. 1969). Neither act requires that "blockbusting" representations be
based on the profit motive.

ments came within the ambit of those proscribed by the statute
and were made by a person while engaged in, and as an integral
part of the practice known as "blockbusting," the statute was
not violative of the free speech provision of the first amendment.4
Wagner had been specifically charged with knowingly attempting to induce 5 an individual to transfer an interest in real
property by making the "blockbusting" representations prohibited
by the statute.8 At the trial level, the Criminal Court of Baltimore dismissed the indictment on the basis that it failed to allege
that the defendant was acting for monetary gain when making her
representations. 7 The trial court held that the statute constituted
a reasonable limitation on freedom of speech only to the extent
that it prohibited those inducements made by persons acting for
monetary gain.8 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed
the lower court's decision, ordered the indictment reinstated and
remanded the case for trial.9
"Blockbusting" is the practice of inducing owners of property
to sell because of the actual or rumored advent into the neighborhood of a member of a racial, religious or ethnic group. 10 In the
classic "blockbusting" situation, homes are bought in a white
neighborhood at depressed prices by a speculator and later sold
at inflated prices to blacks who have a limited access to the housing market." Because the "blockbuster" is able to create an arti4. 291 A.2d 161, 167 (Md. 1972).
5. See also Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D.
Ga. 1969), upholding the constitutioality of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e), the federal anti-"blockbusting" statute, which equates any attempt to induce a
person to sell a dwelling by racial representations with a successful inducement.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Wagner, 291 A.2d 161 (Md. 1972).
8. Id. at 8. In his decision, Judge Solomon Liss of the Criminal
Court of Baltimore expressly adopted the nisi prius opinion of Judge Proctor in State v. Mason, Criminal No. 35899 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County (1969). Cf. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D.
Md. 1969) which, in examining the "for profit" limitation of the federal
anti-"blockbusting" statute reasoned that the inclusion of statements made
in a social and political context, as distinguished from a commercial context, i.e., "for profit," would have raised serious first amendment problems. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
9. 291 A.2d 161, 167 (Md. 1972).
10. Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761, 762
(1969).
11. E.g., Chicago Real Estate Board v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530,
224 N.E.2d 793 (1967).
The modus operandi of the typical "blockbuster" consists of direct
personal contacts with white homeowners in a neighborhood. By telephone and door to door solicitation, he predicts an influx of "colored," a
resulting deterioration of local schools, and an increase of crime in the
area. See Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
Such predictions are often either fabricated or exaggerated. The
"blockbuster" usually insists that property values are dropping rapidly and
that every day the white homeowner delays will be costly. With enough
repetition, his conduct may induce a neighborhood panic, and the once
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ficial market, both seller and purchaser lose. Sellers are forced
to dispose of their homes at prices well below their fair market
worth, while purchasers are compelled to pay exorbitant prices
to obtain housing.12
Although "blockbusting" is widely condemned 13 it is only recently that attempts have been made to curb the practice. Neighborhood and real estate associations, as well as government at a local, state, and federal level, have all sought to curtail the practice.
A summary and evaluation of these attempts will serve to illumine
the complexity of the problem and provide an appropriate introduction to the solution offered by the court in Wagner.
Efforts by neighborhood associations to prevent "blockbusting"
have been confined, for the most part, to the use of educational
and persuasive measures to promote neighborhood stabilization
and discourage panic selling. But because they lack any real
power to force realtors to cooperate, and as they often have difficulty maintaining control over their own membership, neighborhood associations have proved an inadequate antidote to "blockbusting."' 4 Self-policing by the real estate industry has also
proved ineffective. Sanctions imposed on "blockbusters" have little deterrent value,1 5 and even expulsion from a real estate association does little damage to the violator, as membership is voluntary and not essential. 16
State and local governments have promulgated legislative and
administrative measures to curtail "blockbusting.' 7 Regulation
varies as to both scope and specificity. Some jurisdictions have
all-white or slightly integrated neighborhood quickly becomes all-black.
See note 12 infra.
The modem "blockbuster" does not always purchase homes for resale
himself. Instead, he may serve as an agent in panic sales from white
owners to black buyers, skimming off profits from the numerous conditions attendant to transforming a neighborhood. E.g. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969); United States v. Mintzes,
304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
12. Comment, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170 (1970); Vitchek, Confessions13.of aU.S.
Blockbuster, SAT. EVEN. POST, July 14, 1962, at 15.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN NEW YORK, ATLANTA, GA.,
AND CHICAGO, ILL., HousrnG HEARING, 218-19, 224, 226, 379 (1959); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT, 516-18 (1959).

14. E.g. Keefe v. Organization for a Better Austin, 115 Ill. App. 2d
236, 253 N.E.2d 76 (1969) where it was held that a neighborhood organization cannot compel a "blockbuster" to sign a fair practices agreement.
15. Comment, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170 (1970).
16.

HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS

187-90 (1969).
17.

122-26

See 4 U.S.

(1961),

COMMISSION ON

CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON HOUSING

summarizing state and local anti-"blockbusting" efforts.

statutes defining the practice and banning it outright.,
Others
have sought to limit "blockbusting" indirectly: Massachusetts
and Vermont forbid fraudulent representations for the purposes of
inducing sales or obtaining listings; 19 municipalities prohibit door
to door solicitation except by real estate agents who have applied for a special permit; 20 other cities regulate the size and
location of "for sale" signs, thereby curbing one of the more ob21
vious panic-inducing weapons in the "blockbuster's" arsenal.
Another approach to the problem of controlling "blockbusting"
22
is the use of real estate licensing agencies to police the industry.
But the statutes creating these commissions often militate against
their own effectiveness by requiring that commissioners be recruited exclusively from the membership of the community they
23
are supposed to supervise.
Human relations commissions have also been set up by state
and local governments to investigate "blockbusting" and other complaints of discriminatory practices. 24 A major structural defect of
most human relations commissions is that though they may initiate
investigations, they have no authority to file complaints for the
purpose of instituting enforcement proceedings. 25 Although a few
states have authority to file complaints, they have, by and large,
rarely done so.26
18. See note 3 supra.
19. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87AAA (Supp. 1970); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 2295 (1967).
20. E.g. Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761
(1969). The constitutionality of regulations barring solicitation has been
upheld by the Supreme Court in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1961).
21. E.g., Detroit, Michigan, Ordinance 753-F, reprinted in 7 RACE REL.
L. RPTR. 1260 (1962); Teaneck, New Jersey, Ordinance 1157, Oct. 16, 1962, reprinted in 7 RACE REL. L. R'am. 1262 (1962).
22. Statutes authorize these agencies to issue regulations and to sanction violations by suspension or revocation of licenses. E.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. §§ 20-320(11), 20-328 (1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1403 (1967);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-1 et seq. (1963); N.Y. ExEc. § 296(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 436, 440 (1968).
23. See Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761,
766 (1969).
24. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 956-57 (1964).
25. See generally Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal
System: Proposalsfor a Better Use of the Administrative Process, 74 YALE
L.J. 1171, 1191-93 (1965).
26. Id. at 1192. The Pennsylvania commission is a notable exception
and has made substantial use of its authority to initiate enforcement proceedings. Evaluating the work of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (prior to 1961, known as the Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission), Witherspoon finds:
In its first operating year, the Pennsylvania commission initiated 52 per cent of the complaints it processed. In the second and
third years it initiated at least 40 per cent of the complaints processed. In subsequent years the commission has initiated a significant percentage of processed complaints of discrimination in employment, public accommodations and housing. The Pennsylvania
commission [also] has . . . [an] . . . excellent record of 'satisfactory adjustments' of complaints through conciliation ....
The ex-
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Prosecution under criminal statutes2 7 has produced few cases,
presumably because of the difficulty of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite criminal intent.28 In addition, there is
an acknowledged lack of enthusiasm shared by local prosecutors
29
in bringing white-collar criminals to trial.
Prior to the Fair Housing Act (1968),30 federal regulation of
"blockbusting" was based on the thirteenth amendment 3 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.32 In the first federal anti-"blockbusting"
suit, Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment,3 a group of
black purchasers alleged that a realtor had violated the 1866 Act
by charging them higher prices for their homes than he would have
charged white buyers in a normal market. The "blockbuster" had
reaped inordinate profits from exploiting a system of de facto segregation that he and other realtors had helped create.8 4 Relying
on the thirteenth amendment and the 1866 Act, the district court
held that this discrimination deprived negroes of the same rights
as whites to buy real estate. s3 Although the Contract Buyers decision afforded relief to the black purchaser, it failed to respond
to the plight of the white homeowner who, having been defrauded
on the transaction, was unable to avail himself of the protection
of either the thirteenth amendment or the 1866 Act.38
Congress responded to the need for more comprehensive antiperience of the Pennsylvania Commission indicates that a commission can readily initiate a minimum of 35 to 50 per cent of the
total number of complaints processed without loss of efficiency.
27. See note 3 supra.
28. See Comment, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170, 174 (1970).
29. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTIcE, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 47-49 (1967).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. IV, 1969). For the text of the federal
anti-"blockbusting" provision see note 37 infra.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides:
§ 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.
§ 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.
33. 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
34. Id. at 214.
35. Id. at 216. Damages in the amount of the price differential were
awarded.
36. See New York, Times, Mar. 29, 1969, at 23, col. 6, containing an
interview with Assistant Attorney General Leonard of the U.S. Department of Justice.

"blockbusting" legislation by passage of the Fair Housing Act of
1968 . 7 Victims were provided three avenues of relief: (1) conciliation through the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 8 private actions, 39 and public suits brought by the Justice
Department. 40 The first two forms of relief have proved ineffective. H.U.D. suffers from understaffing and a lack of enforcement
power under the Act. 41 Also, expenses of litigation discourage civil
suits by those who have been "blockbusted." Public action, under the aegis of the Justice Department, has emerged as the most
potent remedy in the 1968 Act, because the Attorney General has
far greater resources than individual litigants to oversee compli42
ance with injunctive relief.
The constitutionality of the federal anti-"blockbusting" provision has been upheld in several decisions. 43 It has been sustained
under the thirteenth amendment as a rational means of effectuating
the stated purpose of the Fair Housing Act (1968), which was "to
provide, within constitutional limitations, fair housing throughout
the United States."' 4 4 The anti-"blockbusting" provision has also
been held constitutional under first amendment free speech requirements,' 5 as the statements prohibited by the Act must be
made "for profit." Had the Act also prohibited statements not "for
profit," but made in a "social or political context," serious first
46
amendment problems would have been raised.
37.

42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. IV, 1969) makes it unlawful:
For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell
or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry into
the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color,
religion, or national origin (emphasis added).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-3611 (Supp. IV, 1969).
39. Id. § 3612.
40. Id. § 3613.
41. See Comment, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L.J. 170, 178 (1970).
42. Id. at 181. There is, however, a major statutory impediment to
the effectiveness of the public action. The Attorney General, before he

can act, must have:

reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment
of any of the rights granted by this subchapter and [that] such
denial raises an issue of general public importance . . . (emphasis

added).
42 U.S.C. § 3613 (Supp. IV, 1969).

The minimum number of incidents necessary to create a pattern or

practice has not been established by the courts, but has been left to the
discretion of the trial judge. This would appear logical, as the number
would depend on the nature of the right protected and the nature of the
ordinary violations of such right. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F.
Supp. 1305, 1314 (D. Md. 1969).
43. E.g., Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969);
United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. IV, 1969). See Brown v. State Realty Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Gal. 1969); United States v. Mintzes, 304
F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law.
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...."
46. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md.
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In State v. Wagner, the Court of Special Appeals confirmed
the validity of a Maryland statute which goes beyond federal anti"blockbusting" legislation, by not requiring the "blockbuster" to
act for profit. When the prohibited statements come within the
ambit of the statute and are made by a person "while engaged in,
and as an integral part" of the practice known as "blockbusting,"
the court held that the Maryland act does not violate the free
47
speech provision of the first amendment.
Interpreting the statute in the light of its preamble, the Wagner court sought to justify the legislature's action by stressing
the public importance of broadly phrased anti-"blockbusting" provisions. The court reasoned that the Maryland Legislature did not
intend to limit the statute's application to those who would engage
in "blockbusting" only for financial gain, because it undoubtedly
wished to protect the public against the ingenuity of those whose
participation in the condemned practice could not be readily
4
identified with a financial motivation.
To the extent that the practice of "blockbusting" involves the
making of the representations proscribed in the Maryland statute,
even when not for monetary gain, it is "clearly beyond the protection of the first amendment," according to the Wagner court. 49
In support of this proposition, the Wagner court relied upon a
federal district court decision, United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc.50 Clearly, Lawrence provides only questionable authority on this point. Although the court in Lawrence did hold
that the federal anti-"blockbusting" statute 1 was not violative of
first amendment rights, 52 it based its decision on the theory that
the federal statute does not make mere speech unlawful, but does
prohibit "economic exploitation of racial bias and panic selling."-"-,
1969), wherein the court states:

The words 'for profit' . . .were evidently included in § 3604
(e) to distinguish and eliminate from the operation of that subsection statements made in social, political or other contexts, as distinguished from a commercial context, where the person making
the representations hopes to obtain some financial gain as a result
of the representations. . . The inclusion of statements made in
social or political contexts would have raised serious first amendment problems (emphasis added).
47. State v. Wagner, 291 A.2d 161, 167 (Md. 1972).
48. Id. at 166.
49.

Id.

50. 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
51. See note 37 supra. It is important to distinguish between the
federal statute which requires a "blockbuster" to act "for profit" and the
Maryland statute which does not. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
52. 313 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
53. Id. Accord, United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529, 533 (D.
Md. 1971).

Thus, it would appear that Lawrence and the instant case are
easily distinguishable. In validating a statute not limited to proscribing representations made for monetary gain, the Wagner decision strays beyond the economic exploitation factor deemed essen4
tial in Lawrence.
In further support of its interpretation of the first amendment,
the Wagner court stated that:
[I] t has long been fundamental that where speech is an integral part55of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional
protection.
Authority for this proposition is sought from a 1948 United States
Supreme Court decision, Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.,56
where an ice peddlers' union was picketing wholesale ice distributors in an effort to induce the latter not to sell to non-union peddlers. Such agreement, if consummated, would have been illegal
under a Missouri statute declaring combinations in restraint of trade
to be unlawful.5 7 The Supreme Court unanimously held, in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, that the state statute was
applicable to labor unions, and that the right of free speech does
not extend to an exercise in furtherance of an illegal end-in this

case a commercial agreement to sell to union members only. It is
submitted that Giboney is distinguishable from Wagner on the basis that the unlawful conduct that Giboney ruled was unprotected
by the first amendment is based on economic exploitation, in that
the union was attempting to restrain trade and monopolize the
profits of the retail ice industry. Wagner, however, restrains conduct, even when it is not based on monetary gain.58 Thus, Giboney is not convincing support for Wagner's conclusion that statements not made in a commercial context are excludable from the
protection of the first amendment.
Wagner further asserts that its principle, that speech has no

constitutional protection when it is an integral part of unlawful
conduct, has been previously applied in support of a Chicago anti"blockbusting" ordinance. 5 9 The ordinance forbids real estate
54. See note 46 supra. See United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529,
533 (D. Md. 1971) for a discussion of those areas in which free speech may
be constitutionally limited. See also Comment, Freedom of Expression in
a Commercial Context, 78 IHaRv. L. RE v. 1191 (1965).
55. 291 A.2d 161, 166 (Md. 1972).
56. 336 U.S. 490 (1948). The Court in Giboney stated that:
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom
for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute.
Id. at 498.
57. Mo. REv. STAT. § 8301 (1939).
58. 291 A.2d 161, 167 (Md. 1972).
59. Chicago, Ill., Ordinance to Prohibit "Panic Peddling" by Real
Estate Brokers, Sept. 11, 1963, as cited in Chicago Real Estate Board v.
City of Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967).
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brokers to solicit sales of property from Caucasians on the ground
that loss of value will ensue because Negroes have moved or are
about to move into a neighborhood. 60 Chicago Real Estate Board
v. City of Chicago,61 citing Giboney, declared that "blockbusting"
by brokers, as prohibited in the Chicago ordinance, was the type
of "unlawful conduct" not entitled to first amendment protection. By its express limitation to brokers, the Chicago ordinance
and its judicial affirmation are seeking to regulate the conduct
only of the real estate industry. The Maryland statute affirmed in
Wagner, however, is distinguishable upon the basis that it specifically deletes the profit motive, indigenous to brokers, and is applicable to "any person, firm, corporation or association" engaging
in the practice of "blockbusting. ' 62 The Chicago case, limited as it
is to a profit-seeking class of individuals, is therefore inappropriate
support for Wagner, which excludes nearly everyone from first
amendment protection who "blockbusts" or attempts to "blockbust,'.' whether or not for monetary gain. 63
In further support of its contention that constitutional guarantees of free speech are not available to "blockbusters," even
when not acting for monetary gain, Wagner utilizes two recent
federal decisions, United States v. Hunter64 and United States v.
Mintzes.65 But Hunter, in upholding the constitutionality of a provision66 of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, expressly states that: "the
restrictions of § 3604(d) limit speech only in a commercial context,
not in relation to the dissemination of ideas. ' 67 Hunter, restricted
as it is to limitations on free speech in a discriminatory commercial context, is thus also inapplicable to the anti-"blockbusting" ar60. Id. at 797. The ordinance further prohibits the distribution by
brokers- of any written material on statements designed to induce the
owner to sell or lease his property for such reasons.
61. 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967).
62. State v. Wagner, 291 A.2d 161, 162, 166-67 (Md. 1972).
63. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969) and
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ga.
1970), which both support the proposition that whereas economic exploitation of racial bias and panic selling may not be entitled to first amendment
protection, mere speech is.
64. 324 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971).
65. 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) makes it unlawful:
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national
orign, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.
67. 324 F. Supp. 529, 533 (D. Md. 1971) (emphasis added).

68
gument in Wagner.
The Mintzes decision provides even less support for the Wagner court than Hunter. Construing the words "for profit," as used
in the federal anti-"blockbusting" statute, 69 Mintzes held that:
the words were evidently included . ..to distinguish and
eliminate from the operation of that subsection statements
made in social, political or other contexts, as distinguished
from a commercial context, where the person making the
representations hopes to obtain some financial gain as a result of the representations. The inclusion of statements
made in a social or political context
would have raised
7 o
serious first amendment problems.
The Mintzes decision, therefore, does not corroborate the Maryland court's holding that the profit motive is not fundamental to
the exclusion of "blockbusting" representations from the protection
of the first amendment. Mintzes would be more appropriately cited
for the proposition that the exclusion of the requirement of a profit
motive from an anti-"blockbusting" provision "raise [s] serious first
amendment problems."
The Maryland anti-"blockbusting" statute,7 1 in attempting to
extend the purview of the federal act 7 2 by foregoing the necessity
of proof of profit motive, has raised substantial first amendment
questions. In its desire to consecrate legislative action, Maryland's
Court of Special Appeals in Wagner has failed to recognize first
amendment conflicts. Authority summoned to affirm its singular
holding is distinguishable both on facts and legal principles. The
Wagner court, in its zeal to eradicate the admittedly pernicious
practice of "blockbusting," has permitted the Maryland Legislature
to impinge upon a citizen's right to free speech as guaranteed in
the first amendment.

JAY ROBERT STIEFEL

68.

See generally Comment, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial

Context, 78 HA v. L. REv. 1191 (1965).

69. See note 37 supra.
70. 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969) (emphasis added). Accord,
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Ga.
1970).
71. See note 3 supra.
72. See note 37 supra.

CRIMINAL LAW-PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE RULED
ADMISSIBLE IN MURDER PROSECUTION TO
DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT
ACTED IN HEAT OF PASSION

Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. McCusker' held that "psychiatric evidence is admissible in a murder prosecution for the limited purpose of determining whether a
defendant acted in the heat of passion."'2 Although the court expressly stated that the M'Naghten standard remains the test for
legal sanity, psychiatric evidence is now admissible to show diminished capacity 4 in an attempt to prove that, in response to adequate provocation, an act was done in the heat of passion, even
though the difference between right and wrong was not obscured
by the defendant's mental disorders.
In McCusker, the defendant was found guilty of the seconddegree murder of his wife. Although two eyewitnesses saw the
actual slaying, they were not present immediately prior to the slaying. Consequently, only the defendant was able to testify as to
the events which immediately preceded the killing. The defense
attempted unsuccessfully to admit into evidence the testimony of
two psychologists and two psychiatrists. The testimony would

have established that the defendant was impassioned at the time
of the offense. The doctors would have stated that the passion
was the result of the defendant's mental disorders5 coupled with
1. 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972).
2. Id. at 384, 292 A.2d at 287.
3. Id. at 393, 292 A.2d at 292.
4. To show diminished capacity is to indicate that a defendant was
mentally incapable of forming the requisite higher intent, and the defendant can therefore be held responsible only for the intent actually
formed. For example, a defendant mentally unable to form the first degree specific intent to kill could at most be found guilty of second degree
murder. See authority cited notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
The majority opinion does not state that the diminished capacity doctrine,
or any other doctrine is adopted. Justice Eagen, in the concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice O'Brien joined, believed the majority's
extension of admissibility was the adoption of the diminished responsibility doctrine. Id. at 396, 292 A.2d at 293.
5. The types of mental disorders which may be shown are not specified in the majority opinion. Presumably, any psychiatric testimony
which bears on the probability of the defendant having reacted in a heat
of passion is admissible.

(1) his recent discovery, within a month prior to the slaying, of
Mrs. McCusker's meretricious relationship with the defendant's
stepbrother; (2) Mrs. McCusker's threat, immediately before the
crime, to leave the defendant and retain custody of their only
child; and (3) the defendant's knowledge, within minutes of the
crime, that Mrs. McCusker was perhaps pregnant with his stepbrother's child. 6 Because the trial court did not allow the defendant to introduce psychiatric evidence relevant to whether the
slaying was committed in the heat of passion, 7 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the judgment and granted a new trial.
In essence, by permitting psychiatric evidence to prove heat of
passion, the supreme court has ruled by implication that psychiatric testimony is admissible to negate malice aforethought, the distinguishing element between murder and manslaughter." Once adequate provocation and insufficient cooling time are shown,9 psychiatric evidence is admissible on the question of whether the defendant actually acted in the heat of passion, or whether in fact
the defendant "cooled" and acted with malice aforethought. 10
The evidence is therefore defensively useful to prove the defendant's act was voluntary manslaughter, which although still an intentional killing, results from adequate provocation which produces a heat of passion in the reasonable man and causes him to
react without "cooling" and reflecting." But only after both the
provocation and lack of cooling time have been found objectively
to be adequate to arouse the reasonable man does the psychiatric
evidence become relevant to ascertain the defendant's subjective
response to the provocation. 12 Psychiatric testimony may then
6. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 388-89, 292 A.2d 286,
289-90 (1972).
7. Id. at 385, 292 A.2d at 288.

8. Malice aforethought is the subjective factor essential to the crime

of murder and includes hatred of the victim, wickedness of disposition,
hardness of heart, cruelty, reckless disregard of consequences, or unmindfulness of social duty. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113
A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 41 A.2d 574
(1945); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 293 Pa. 218, 142 A. 213 (1928). Malice aforethought is an element of murder in either degree and distinguishes
murder from manslaughter, whereas an intent to kill distinguishes first
degree murder from second degree. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 275 Pa.
338, 119 A. 403 (1923).
9. Only in very rare and exceptional cases can a court hold as a
matter of law that a defendant had adequate cooling time. Commonwealth v. Dews, 429 Pa. 555, 239 A.2d 382 (1968). The McCusker trial court
found sufficient cooling time had elapsed.
10. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 390, 292 A.2d 286, 290
(1972).
11. Id. at 389-90, 292 A.2d at 290.
12. Id. at 384, 387-90, 292 A.2d at 287, 289-90. Adequacy of provocation and lack of cooling time, because they are based on the reasonable
man standard, are purely objective tests. Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa.
145, 155-56, 200 A. 632, 636 (1938); Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 586,
15 A. 465 (1888).
A cumulative series of related events may constitute

Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

be introduced to indicate whether the defendant reacted in a
heat of passion, which includes any of the emotions of the mind
13
known as anger, rage, sudden resentment, and terror.
It is important to note the limited purpose for which psychiatric evidence is admissible under the McCusker decision. Because
the role of psychiatric testimony is limited to determining whether
the defendant acted in the heat of passion, the evidence is not admissible under McCusker to aid in determining whether the defendant formed the specific intent to kill' 4 required by statute to
convict for first degree murder. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has expressly refused to admit psychiatric evidence to determine whether a defendant was capable of having the specific intent to kill of first degree murder, where insanity is not put forth
as a complete defense. 15 As the Commonwealth bears the burden
of proving the defendant's act was first degree murder, 6 psychiatric testimony if admissible could aid the defendant in proving the
17
lesser offense of second degree murder.
sufficient provocation. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389, 292
A.2d 286, 290 (1972).
13. Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 350-51, 80 A. 571, 574

(1911). Lay evidence, as well as professional, is admissible on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense where defendant asserts he
acted in the heat of passion. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382,
391, 292 A.2d 286, 290-91 (1972).
14. The intent to kill, distinctly formed for even a moment, is sufficient to supply the qualities of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation
otherwise essential by statute to murder in the first degree. Commonwealth v. Maloney, 365 Pa. 1, 73 A.2d 707 (1950); Commonwealth v. Daynarowicz, 275 Pa. 235, 119 A. 77 (1922).
15. Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, 446 Pa. 241, 284 A.2d 687 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70, 274 A.2d 182 (1971); Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540 (1967); Commonwealth v. Ahearn,
421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 565 (1966). Prior to 1966, a series of lower court decisions permitted a psychiatrist to give expert opinion on a defendant's state
of mind, and on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely questioned the weight to be given psychiatric evidence but did not rule the
evidence inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d
911 (1963); Commonwealth v. Jorden, 407 Pa. 575, 181 A.2d 310 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Tyrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A.2d 852 (1961); Commonwealth
v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v. Neill,
362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949). Other than at the trial stage, Pennsylvania recognizes the validity of psychiatric evidence to determine a defendant's capacity to stand trial. Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199,
150 A.2d 102 (1959); Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 23, 117 A.2d 96,
99 (1955). Psychiatric evidence is also admitted as an aid in determining a
penalty after guilt has been established. Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355
Pa. 555, 559, 50 A.2d 328, 329 (1947); Commonwealth v. Stabinsky, 313 Pa.
231, 238, 169 A. 439, 442 (1933).
16. Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 A. 632 (1938).
17. The testimony would show that although a defendant acted with
malice aforethought, deliberation and premeditation were lacking.

Aside from the evidentiary impact of the McCusker decision,
the case also indicates that Pennsylvania has partially adopted the
doctrine of diminished capacity. While the majority of states do
not recognize diminished capacity, a strong minority viewpoint permits evidence of mental disorder to be admitted under the doctrine on the question of whether the defendant possessed the
requisite mens rea for the crime alleged. 18 Most of the minority do
not follow the McCusker limitation on admissibility of psychiatric
evidence to differentiate solely between the murder and manslaughter mens rea (malice aforethought and heat of passion), but
also permit the evidence to aid in the first-second degree intent
determination. 9 Diminished capacity, it should be noted, is not
the equivalent of diminished responsibility. The latter doctrine
admits psychiatric evidence to effect a mercy reduction of the offense from murder to manslaughter not because a defendant
completely failed to achieve the requisite higher mental intent,
but solely because of a defendant's weakened psychiatric ability to
resist the higher mental intention he possessed.20 The mercy reduction recognizes no responsibility for the greater crime even though
all the elements of the crime are present, 21 and this is contrary to
the doctrine of diminished capacity which admits psychiatric evidence to indicate and hold22the defendant responsible for whatever
mental intent he achieved.

Several factors support the view that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McCusker adopted a limited version of the doctrine
of diminished capacity. The McCusker court, for instance, permitted psychiatric evidence on the issue of whether the defendant possessed the mental intent of voluntary manslaughter (heat
18. In nineteen other jurisdictions where the question has been considered, psychiatric evidence is admissible to some extent on the issue of
intent. Annot. 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1239 (1968). Nine other jurisdictions and
the District of Columbia have refused to admit the evidence when the
question arose. Id. at 1235. The doctrine has been almost exclusively
limited, however, to the intentional crimes of murder and manslaughter.
19. See, e.g., State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964);
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963);
State v. Di Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961); Battalino v. People,
118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948).
20. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE, 191-202 (1967); J. HALL & G.
MUELLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 532-36 (2d ed. 1965); F. LINDMAN
& D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 355-57 (1961).
21. Id.

22. Id. That Pennsylvania already recognized diminished responsi-

bility to some extent is seen in Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348,

266 A.2d 726 (1970).

It was held that conviction of voluntary manslaughter

was proper although the evidence did not support a verdict of guilty on
such charge in that it did not establish that the defendant acted while un-

der the influence of passion engendered by sufficient legal provocation.
See also the dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571,

577, 220 A.2d 807, 810 (1966), which indicates that the trial judge should
charge voluntary manslaughter in every murder case.
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of passion).23 This application of the evidence, although limited to
voluntary manslaughter, is the same as under the doctrine of diminished capacity, which is similarly concerned with holding the
defendant responsible for whatever mental intent he actually pos24
sessed.
Additional evidence of the acceptance of the doctrine is the incorporation of New Jersey precedent which espouses the diminished
capacity standard. 25 In State v. Di Paolo, 26 the trial court admitted psychiatric evidence, and the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that evidence of mental illness is competent upon the issue
of whether the crime is first or second degree murder. 27 The court
stated:
Actually the question is simply whether there shall be excluded e-idence which merely denies the existence of facts
which the State must prove to establish that the murder
was in the first degree ....

The capacity of an individ-

ual to premeditate, to deliberate, or to will to execute a
homicidal design, or any deficiency in that capacity, may
bear upon the question whether he in fact did so act.
Hence evidence of any defect, deficiency, trait, condition,
or illness which rationally bears upon the question
whether 28
those mental operations did in fact occur must be
accepted.
New Jersey clearly utilizes a diminished capacity standard as
mental disorder is relevant in the consideration of the mens rea
which a defendant achieved and for which he will be held responsible. In Di Paolo, the admissibility of psychiatric evidence was
not limited to the murder-manslaughter distinction, since the evidence was admitted in an unsuccessful attempt to negate willfulness and premeditation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's citation to Di Paolo indicates the court's adoption of a diminished
capacity theory and its willingness to apply the doctrine in the
future.
Further indication of the Pennsylvania court's adoption of a
diminished capacity standard is provided by the other authority
upon which the court relied in McCusker. The cases were cited by
the court to justify the application of the diminished capacity doc23.
24.
25.

Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972).
See authority cited at note 20 supra.
Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 393, 292 A.2d 286, 292

(1972).

26.
27.
28.

34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961).
Id. at 295, 168 A.2d at 409.
Id. at 294-95, 168 A.2d at 409 (emphasis supplied).

trine to the murder-manslaughter question, 29 but the factual circumstances of each decision were concerned with the first-second
degree distinction. In People v. Henderson,30 the California Supreme Court permitted the use of psychiatric evidence to determine whether the defendant was capable of forming the requisite
mens rea of first degree murder. Similarly in Battalino v. People,"' the Colorado Supreme Court, under the aegis of statutory
law, authorized expert testimony in reference to a defendant's
mental condition and his resultant disability "to form the specific
intent essential" 32 thereby permitting psychiatric evidence to
indicate second rather than first degree murder. Finally, the
Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Gramenz33 sustained a lower
court's failure to instruct on the requirements to reduce murder to
involuntary manslaughter, although the only evidence offered
by the defendant tended not to negate malice aforethought, but to
negate premeditation and deliberation.
The McCusker court's citation of these other jurisdictions
which apply the diminished capacity standard to first-second degree intent, indicates that Pennsylvania has adopted, although only
paritally, the doctrine of diminished capacity. Justice Eagen in
dissent 3 4 is correct in contending that the McCusker decision "opens
the door '3 5 to the admission of psychiatric evidence. The door is
partially opened, however, under the doctrine of diminished capacity rather than diminished responsibility, as the defendant remains responsible for whatever mental intent-malice aforethought or heat of passion-which he possessed at the time of the
killing.
It is unlikely that Pennsylvania will continue to limit the diminished capacity doctrine solely to the heat of passion determination. The limited embracement of the doctrine appears to be necessitated only by the facts of McCusker. It is submitted, consequently, that the partial acceptance of diminished capacity should
be extended in the future to admit psychiatric evidence to determine willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation-the elements of
the specific intent to kill of first degree murder. Extension is warranted because if psychiatric evidence is relevant and probative to
determine heat of passion, 36 the evidence is just as relevant and
29. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 393, 292 A.2d 286, 292
(1972).
30. 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
31. 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948).
32. COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-1 (1963).
33. 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964).
34. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 395, 292 A.2d 286, 293
(1972).
35. Id. at 396, 292 A.2d at 293.
36. The court in McCusker accepts psychiatric evidence as relative
and probative for three reasons: (1) the familiar argument that psychiatry has come-of-age as a modern medical science; (2) psychiatric evidence
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probative in regard to the specific intent to kill as both issues are
equally subjective. The jurisdictions cited in the text of the McCusker opinion as having similar admissibility standards for psychiatric testimony in fact do not limit the evidence to the heat of
passion, but admit the evidence on the issue of specific intent to
kill.87 Furthermore, prior to 1966, psychiatrists were permitted by
Pennsylvania courts to give expert opinion on a defendant's state
of mind and capacity for willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation.3 s Those decisions subsequent to 1965 which denied admissibility of psychiatric testimony on the question of specific intent to
kill are not significantly distinguished in the McCusker majority
opinion.39 Some of the justices in the McCusker majority in fact
dissented in those decisions subsequent to 1965 which denied admissibility. 40 Finally, because in Pennsylvania voluntary intoxication when sufficient to deprive the mind of the power to form a
41
specific intent to kill precludes a finding of first degree murder,
is used at other stages of the Pennsylvania judicial process; (3) the
anomaly that the evidence is received at the trial stage under the complete defense of insanity, but not under the partial defense of heat of passion. Id. at 287, 291, 292 A.2d at 385, 391-92.
37. See authority cited note 19 supra.
38. See note 15 supra.
39. The decisions, see note 15 supra, are distinguished merely by the
statement that they "dealt with the issue of whether a defendant could
introduce psychiatric evidence to show he lacked the capacity to deliberate
and premeditate. Moreover, those cases regarded the competency of psychiatric testimony with a rigidity which has been constructively criticized. . . ." Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 387, 292 A.2d 286,
288-89 (1972).
40. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972) (majority opinion by Roberts, J.; concurring and dissenting opinion by Eagen, J., in which O'Brien, J. joined); Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, 446
Pa. 241, 284 A.2d 687 (1971) (majority opinion by Bell, C.J.; concurring
opinion by Barbieri, J.; dissenting opinion by Roberts, J., in which Jones
and Pomeroy, JJ., joined); Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70,
274 A.2d 182 (1971) (opinion in suport of affirmance of judgment by Bell,
C.J.; Eagen and O'Brien, JJ., concurred in the result; opinion in support of
reversal of judgment by Roberts, J., in which Jones and Pomeroy, JJ.,
joined); Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969)
(opinion in support of affirmance of judgment by Bell, C.J.; opinion in
support of reversal of judgment by Roberts, J., in which Jones, J., joined;
Cohen, J., dissented); Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540
(1967) (majority opinion by Eagen, J.; concurring opinion by Bell, C.J.;
dissenting opinion by Roberts, J.; Cohen, J., dissented); Commonwealth v.
Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966) (majority opinion by Bell, C.J.;
dissenting opinion by Roberts, J., in which Jones, J., joined; dissenting
opinion by Cohen, J.).
41. Commonwealth v. Mosley, 444 Pa. 134, 279 A.2d 174 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v.
Barnosky, 436 Pa. 59, 258 A.2d 512 (1969); Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433
Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969); Commonwealth v. McCausland, 348 Pa. 275, 35
A.2d 70 (1944).

it seems no logical or compelling reason can be found why psychiatric evidence should not be admissible to establish a similar mental incapacity on the part of a defendant in order to preclude a
42
conviction of first degree murder.
Pennsylvania thus has three separate standards in regard to
the admissibility of psychiatric evidence in murder trials: (1)
the M'Naghten standard where insanity is plead; (2) the McCusker
diminished capacity standard which permits psychiatric evidence
to be admitted to determine whether a defendant subjectively
reacted in the heat of passion to objectively adequate provocation;
and (3) the first-second degree standard which admits no psychiatric testimony to aid in the determination of the degree of murder. Actually, no incongruity exists in simultaneously having both
the M'Naghten and McCusker standards, as both permit psychiatric testimony to show the intent formed and hold the defendant
responsible only for the mental intent possessed. An incongruity
does exist, however, in only partially accepting the diminished
capacity doctrine and in not admitting psychiatric evidence on the
first-second degree determination. 43 Indeed, other states have successfully adopted a broader diminished capacity standard for use in
44
conjunction with the M'Naghten insanity test.
It is apparent, therefore, that Pennsylvania in McCusker has
partially adopted a standard of diminished capacity. Where adequate
provocation and insufficient cooling time can be proved, in many
instances defendants will attempt to introduce psychiatric testimony to show some type of mental problem in hopes of lowering
the offense from murder to manslaughter by proving the killing was committed in the heat of passion. Since the burden is
always on the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant formed
the requisite mens rea of malice aforethought, 45 the defendant can
introduce evidence of his diminished capacity and resultant heat
of passion reaction in order to rebut the Commonwealth's murder case without any prior formal plea or claim of insanity-usually a distinct tactical advantage. Increased use of psychiatric evidence will thus occur, and the use will become even greater if the
evidence becomes admissible on the first-second degree murder intent. Indeed, no sufficient rationale, other than an arbitrary one,
can be found to sustain a continued limitation on the admissibility of psychiatric evidence solely to determine whether a defend42. This statement is especially accurate when the involuntariness of

mental disorder is compared with the voluntariness of intoxication. Note,
Commonwealth v. Ahearn: Psychiatric Testimony Ruled Inadmissible in
Murder Trial to Show Lack of Deliberation and Premeditation, 71 DICK L.
REV. 100 (1966).
43. The reasons for the incongruity are enumerated in the text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
44. See authority cited note 19 supra.
45. See authority cited note 16 supra.
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ant acted in the heat of passion. 40 An extension of admissibility to
include the statutory degrees of murder is the next logical step,
and the extension will be the equivalent of full adoption in murder prosecutions of the doctrine of diminished capacity.
DAVID

46.

See text accompanying notes 36-42 sup'a.

R.

ESHELMAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
THE COMPULSORY PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT ORDERED FOR
THE INDETERMINATE COMMITMENT OF THE
DEFENDANT TO A MENTAL INSTITUTION

McNeil v. Director,Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972)
Edward McNeil was tried and convicted in a Maryland court on
two charges of assault.1 Although no psychiatric issues were raised
at the trial, the sentencing judge asked for a psychiatric evaluation of McNeil. He was sentenced to five years in prison, and on
the recommendation of the court's medical officer, he was further
ordered to Patuxent Institution2 for a determination of whether he
was a defective delinquent.3 If found to be a defective delinquent, he would be kept at Patuxent for treatment for an indefi4
nite period, without regard to the length of his original sentence.
Under the statutory procedure, a defendant is examined by

the Patuxent staff, including a psychiatrist. A report on the accused's status must be filed no later than six months from the date
he was transferred to the institution or before expiration of his
sentence, whichever first occurs. 5 If the report indicates the accused
is a defective delinquent, a hearing is then held with counsel and
jury to determine whether the accused should be committed to Patuxent.6

However, in the situation where an accused refuses to cooperate with the examining staff, the Maryland courts have con-

strued this statute to allow detention until a determination can
be made.7

McNeil refused to answer the psychiatrist's questions

1. Assault on a public officer and assault with intent to rape.
2. Patuxent Institution was established for the specialized treatment
of defective delinquents. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 1(a) (Supp. 1971).
3. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 5 (Supp. 1971) defines a defective
delinquent as:
an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated
anti-social or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward
criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstate an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement
and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe
for society to terminate the confinement and treatment.
4. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 9(b) (Supp. 1971).
5. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 7(a) (Supp. 1971).
6. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 8 (Supp. 1971).
7. State v. Musgrove, 241 Md. 521, 217 A.2d 247 (1966).
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or cooperate." As a result, no report was filed on his status, and
therefore no hearing was held, although his original term of five
years in prison had expired. The trial court denied post-conviction relief' 0 on the basis of a provision in the Defective Delinquency
Act that authorizes custody of the accused by Patuxent until a report is completed, without regard to whether his criminal sentence
has expired.'1
The United States Supreme Court agreed with McNeil that
the state no longer had power to detain him. They held that confinement in a mental institution for an evaluation for a period
which is in fact indeterminate and long-term cannot rest on a
mere ex parte order but must be surrounded with the appropriate
due process safeguards including a judicial determination that such
confinement is warranted."
In resolving this particular claim,
the Court had little difficulty."- The Court in McNeil relied on
4
Jackson v. Indiana,1
in which it was determined that an incompetent could not be held for a long-term, indefinite period until he
became "competent" to stand trial. Such indeterminate confinements were held not to be warranted without appropriate due
process safeguards. 15 As long as the duration of confinement is
strictly limited, detentions by the state through proceedings that
are surrounded with lesser due process requirements are not invalidated. 6
The majority opinion focused solely on the state's continued
confinement of the petitioner, and ignored the action of the petitioner, that is, his failure to cooperate with the examining psychiatrist. As a result part of the petitioner's claim was not fully dealt
with by the Court. At the heart of McNeil's appeal was the question whether he could withhold cooperation under claim of the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The majority
declined to discuss this claim and, instead, focusing on the con8. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 246 (1972).
9.

Id.

10. Id.at 248.
11. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 6(e) (Supp. 1971).
12. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 249-250
(1972).
13. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas simply states:
It is elementary that there is a denial of due process when a person is committed or, as here, held without a hearing and opportunity to be heard...
Id. at 257.
14. 406 U.S.715 (1972).
15. Id. at 738.
16. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 249-250
(1972).

tinued detention by the state, attacked the state's argument that
refusal to cooperate with psychiatric examiners was analogous to
civil contempt. 17 The majority stated that:
Petitioner claims that he has a right under the Fifth Amendment to withhold cooperation, a claim we need not consider
here. But putting that claim to one side, there is nevertheless a fatal flaw in the State's argument. For if confinement is to rest on a theory of civil contempt, then due
process requires a hearing to determine whether petitioner has in fact behaved in a manner that amounts to
contempt. At such a hearing it could be ascertained
whether petitioner's conduct is willful, or whether it is a
manifestation of mental illness, for which he cannot fairly
be held responsible. . . . Civil contempt is coercive in nature, and consequently there is no j.ustification for confining on a civil contempt theory a person who lacks the
present ability to comply ....
Moreover, a hearing would
provide the appropriate forum for resolution of petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim.' 8
The prisoner may still be confined for an indeterminate period of
time for refusal to answer, not on a theory analogous to civil contempt, but by an actual civil contempt order. 19 Therefore, a
hearing has little substance without a determination by the
United States Supreme Court of the fifth amendment's applicability to those refusing to answer psychiatric questions. A hearing
will only coerce the criminal defendant to submit to the court ordered psychiatric examination.
Although the majority refused to consider the fifth amendment claim, they did not reject it either.20 The majority opinion
indicates that the Court positively reaffirms its earlier extensions
of procedural due process into proceedings for commitment of
criminal defendants to mental institutions. 21 The development of
these extensions may possibly encompass the privilege against selfincrimination.
The concurring opinion by Justice Douglas in McNeil22 squarely
states that the petitioner need not cooperate with the psychiatrist
if doing so would result in a surrender of his right against selfincrimination. 23 Though novel, this position is not a surprising
one. In recent years the United States Supreme Court has rejected
lax state procedures for the commitment of criminals to mental
institutions. 24 The landmark case of Specht v. Patterson2 5 stated
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
son, 386

Id. at 250.
Id. at 250-251.
Id.
Id. at 250.
See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Specht v. PatterU.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).

22. 407 U.S. 245, 252 (1972).

23. Id. at 255.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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that due process requires, for the commitment of a criminal defendant to a mental institution, that the accused
be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard,
be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right
to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own. And
there must be findings 28adequate to make meaningful
any appeal that is allowed.
Self-incrimination, however, was not an issue in Specht. Along
with the guarantees of procedural due process-including self-incrimination-required in juvenile proceedings, 27 the restoration
of procedural due process safeguards to the commitment of criminals for mental treatment, signals a realization that innovative
rehabilitation programs in these areas have fallen short of expectations. 28 Treatment may possibly be minimal, if the institution is
overcrowded and understaffed. 29 Transfer to a mental institution is also undesirable to many criminal defendants, partially due
to the indeterminate sentence imposed, and partially due to the
poor conditions existent at some institutions. These underlying
circumstances must have had some influence on the Court's recent
decisions in this area.
Courts have generally held that the compulsory order of a
criminal defendant to submit to a mental examination is not within
30
Most of
the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.
the decisions in this area, unlike McNeil, involved the situation
26. Id. at 610. In United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355
F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966), the court, discussing the commitment procedures for
a criminal sex offender to a mental institution for an indeterminate period,
stated:
[Ilt is a separate criminal proceeding which may be invoked
after conviction of one of the specified crimes. Petitioner was
therefore entitled to a full judicial hearing before the magnified
sentence was imposed. At such a hearing the requirements of due
process cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such a proceeding is entitled to the full
panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees
in state criminal proceedings....
Id. at 312 (Self-incrimination was not in issue).
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Id. at 22-29. See also George, Due Process in Protective Activities, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 133, 140 (1968).

29. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); the court, in reference to Patuxent Institution, stated:
[d]eficiencies in staff, facilities, and finances would undermine
the efficacy of the Institution and the justification for the law, and
ultimately the constitutionality of its application.
Id. at 516-17.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968);
State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965). See cases cited in 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2265 (McNaughten rev. 1961).

where the issue of insanity was raised at the trial. The privilege
has been denied by some courts on the rationale that a person's
mental condition is real evidence, which is outside the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege.3 1 Another basis for denial is the
waiver theory, that is, when the accused raises the defense
of insanity, he waives any objection to a compulsory mental examination. 2 Several courts, where insanity was an issue at the
trial, have rejected these views.3 3 In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Pomponi,3 4 the Pennsylvnia Supreme Court decided
that decisions 35 of the United States Supreme Court had indicated
that an accused's answers to a psychiatric examination should be
considered testimonial in nature, and therefore, Pomponi con30
Porncluded, the fifth amendment privilege may be invoked.
poni further stated that:
both the language of the fifth amendment and the interests it protects weigh against an extension of the automatic waiver to out-of-court psychiatric examinations.
37

Thus in the specific situation where insanity is an issue at the
trial, there is some support for the view that, although an examination may be ordered, the accused need not answer any of the
psychiatrist's questions.3 8 The distinguishing aspect of an insanity
issue at trial is that the answers to the psychiatrist's questions
may clearly lead to a possible incriminating result if the question
of insanity becomes determinative of the outcome of the trial.3 9
However, where the mental examination is for the purpose of
commitment of the criminal to a mental institution, the possible
incriminating consequences may not be as clear, and may explain
the majority's refusal to decide the fifth amendment issue in McNeil.
Not only is the type of information elicited important to
whether the privilege may be invoked, but also to be considered in
determining the applicability of the privilege are the consequences
31. See, e.g., Battle v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1966); Earley
v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112 (1960).
32. See, e.g., State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. 1959).
33. See, e.g., People v. English, 31 Ill.2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964);
Shepard v. Bowe, 442 P.2d 238 (Ore. 1968).
34. 447 Pa. 154, 284 A.2d 708 (1971).
35. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36. 447 Pa. 154, 159, 284 A.2d 708, 710 (1971).
37. Id. at 161, 284 A.2d at 711.
38. But cf., Note, Pre-Trial Mental Examination and Commitment:
Some Procedural Problems in the District of Columbia, 51 GEO. L.J. 143
(1962); Note, Mental Examinations of Defendants Who Plead Insanity:
Problems of Self-Incrimination, 40 TEmw. L.Q. 366 (1967); Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
1964 Wis. L. REv. 671.
39. See Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 447 Pa. 154, 159-60, 284 A.2d 708, 710 (1971).
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which may result from that information. 40 In concluding that the
accused need not cooperate with the examining psychiatrist, the
concurring opinion by Justice Douglas in McNeil made no distinction between statements which may be incriminating, in the sense
of leading to evidence which may later be used against the person, and statements merely inquiring into the accused's mind to
make a determination of defective delinquency. 41 The concurring
opinion did point out possible incriminating consequences in the
fact that the psychiatrist could ask questions concerning any previous criminal conduct, or that the examination was during a period when the accused was seeking post-conviction relief. 42 However, other language of the concurring opinion asserted that statements elicited from an accused which may be used to commit him
to a mental institution are also within the scope of the privilege.
Justice Douglas stated:
Whatever the Patuxent procedures may be called-whether
civil or criminal-the result under the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the same. As we said in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 . . . there is harm and selfincrimination whenever there is 'a deprivation of liberty';
and there is such a deprivation whatever the
43 name of the
institution, if a person is held against his will.

It is further pointed out as a sanction opposed to the constitutional privilege, that if he speaks and is committed, the accused
is no longer confined for any portion of his original sentence, but
is now held for an indeterminate period. 44 Commitment of a criminal defendant to a mental institution for an indeterminate period is an incriminating consequence of answering a psychiatrist's
45
questions.
A report was never filed on the petitioner because the psychiatrist felt that he could not make a determination of defec40. Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government
PsychiatricExamination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HAZv. L. REv. 648, 660-61 (1970).
41. 407 U.S. 245, 256-257 (1972).
42. Id. at 256.
43. Id. at 257.
44. Id.
45. The criminal defendant who must submit to a psychiatric examination after conviction to determine his place of confinement is still
within the criminal justice system. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S 605
(1967). The civil commitment of an individual to a mental institution is
outside the scope of the questions presented in McNeil. However, a strong
argument could be made, based on the view espoused by Justice Douglas
in McNeil, that the privilege of self-incrimination be extended to the ordinary civil commitment of an individual to a mental institution and its
consequential deprivation of liberty.

tive delinquency without the accused's answering any questions. 4"
A basic query is whether the statute is nullified by allowing the
accused to remain mute, making a determination of defective delinquency impossible. 47 Apparently it only makes a determination
more difficult, as shortly after this decision was handed down the
policy at Patuxent was changed. Reports of non-cooperators are
now made on the basis of prior records and histories, without
personal interviews. 48 Also, the mere order of the accused to be
present at an examination does not violate the privilege. 49 Therefore, the psychiatrist may file a report based on his observation
of the accused, since this type of evidence is real or physical evidence, which is outside the scope of the privilege. 50
The accused in McNeil was to be examined by a psychiatrist,
the results of which would determine his place and length of confinement and not whether he might be confined at all. 51 This distinction should not defeat the privilege. The better view would
be to allow the privilege to enhance the individual's control over
his own situation, based on his own view whether the particular
disposition the state is asserting is the proper one for him.52 As
confinement for an indeterminate period to Patuxent is highly undesirable for some, the result of answering may be viewed as more
serious than if the result were the ordinary criminal consequences.
A meaningful privilege against self-incrimination for the criminal defendant would encompass the incriminating consequence of
being committed to a mental institution for an indeterminate period. 53
CHARLES

H. SAYLOR

46. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 246 (1972).
47. See Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1162 (4th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
48. Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1972, at LI, col. 7.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
50. See Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 447 Pa. 154, 284 A.2d 708 (1971).
51. Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government
PsychiatricExamination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,83 HARV. L. REV. 648, 665-66 (1970).

52.

Id. This view is based on the rationale of the various purposes of

the privilege. For a discussion of the policies of the privilege, see, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
53. Whether a criminal defendant may invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination during a compulsory psychiatric examination will eventually have to be decided. The same day McNeil was decided, the Court
dismissed writ of certiorari to a comprehensive challenge of the Maryland
Defective Delinquency Law, on the grounds that it was improvident since
civil commitment procedures in Maryland were being revised at the time.
One of the contentions was the denial of the right against self-incrimination. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 356 (1972)
(J. Douglas, dissenting).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER FEDERAL COMMON LAW FOR
POLLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATERS

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)
The United States Supreme Court, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,' established a cause of action in aggrieved states, under
the federal common law of nuisance, for the pollution of interstate waters by citizens of another state. By this decision the
2
Court negatived the effect of Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.
which had denied states access to the federal courts for environmental suits when their action could not be founded upon statutory law.
In Illinois' the state of Illinois sued four Wisconsin cities and
two local sewerage commissions for their pollution 4 of Lake Michigan. Neither federal statutes nor the law of the state of Wisconsin
provided a remedy for Illinois whose statutory law5 prohibited the
defendants' polluting discharges. Illinois sought to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court on the
basis that the action was one in which a state was a party 6 and

also that since Wisconsin municipalities were parties that the action was being brought against that state.7 Illinois asked the
Court to abate the nuisance arising from defendants' pollution of
Lake Michigan. The Court, in a unanimous decision, speaking
through Mr. Justice Douglas, held that when interstate water is
polluted an action arises under the common law of the United
States and the parties have federal question jurisdiction in the
federal district courts.
1. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
2. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
3. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
4. Illinois alleged that the cities and sewerage commissions were
discharging 200 million gallons of sewerage into Lake Michigan each day.
Id. at 93.
5. It is a public nuisance: To corrupt or render unwholesome or impure the water of any spring, river, stream, pond or lake, to the injury or
prejudice of others. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 100 § 26 (3) (1972).
6.

"In all Cases .

.

. in which a state shall be Party, the Supreme

Court shall have original Jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
7. "The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all controversies between two or more states." 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1)
(1970).

Recently the United States Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,8 ruled upon facts strikingly similar to those
of the instant case. In Wyandotte the state of Ohio asked the
Court to exercise its original jurisdiction, on the grounds that a
state was a party, 9 to abate the pollution of Lake Erie by the defendant corporation. As in Illinois federal statutory law provided
no relief for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court declined to exercise
its discretionary original jurisdiction' 0 on the basis that the issues
raised by Wyandotte were "bottomed on local law"11 and that the
Court was "ill equipped for the task of fact finding. '12 Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, expressed a preference for
appellate matters of "federal law and national import." 13 In a
vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the Wyandotte
issues presented "a classic type of case congenial to [the Supreme
Court's] jurisdiction"1 4 which "implicate [d] much federal law."'15
The impact of the Wyandotte decision in foreclosing the Supreme Court as a forum for state actions against citizens of other
states polluting common waters was to limit the aggrieved state
to several unsatisfactory alternatives. The complaining state may
bring the action in its own courts in protection of its own proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests or as parens patriae to protect
the health and welfare of its inhabitants.' 7 The effectiveness of
this approach, however, is undermined by the lack of compulsion
upon the state in which the defendants reside to enforce the plaintiff state's injunction.' 8 In addition, if the court of the plaintiff
state anticipates this refusal to cooperate it may not issue the injunction" since equity courts may refuse to issue injunctions where
it is likely that they will not be enforced. 19 However, if the
suffering state brings its action in the courts of the foreign state
8. 401 U.S. .493 (.1971).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, note 6 supra.
10. Ohio V. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 503 (1971).
11. Id. at 497.
12. Id. at 498.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 505 (dissenting opinion).
15. Id. at 507 (dissenting opinion).
16. The nature of a state's quasi-sovereign interest in land was defined
in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907), where the
Court said, "This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain."
17. In such an action the State presents itself as the trustee, guardian
or representative of all its citizens. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19
(1899).
18. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 102

(1971).
19. Reluctance to grant relief in these cases (where the defendant
resides in another state) is also based on the fear of interfering unduly
with the affairs of the other state.
LAWS

RESTATEMENT

94, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).

(SECOND)

CONFLICT OF
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where the defendants reside, it will incur the disadvantage of seeking redress in the defendants' own courts. This strategic difficulty is a policy reason for the availability of federal jurisdiction
20
where this circumstance arises.
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction when a
state brings an action against a citizen of another state. 21 Unlike
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, however, the jurisdiction of the federal district courts is restricted by statutory
requirements.22 The federal district courts do not have jurisdiction unless the parties are of diverse citizenship, 2 or the action
involves a question of federal law. 24 A state does not qualify as
a "citizen" for the purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.2 5 The Wyandotte decision had temporarily foreclosed the
contention that a federal question is presented by the pollution
of interstate waters when the complaint is "bottomed upon local
law,"126 rather than federal statutory authority. Hence the effect
of Wyandotte was to deny access to the federal district courts to
aggrieved states seeking to enjoin citizens of another state from
polluting common waters when there was no violation of federal
statutory law.
In Illinois27 the plaintiff attempted to evade the impact of

Wyandotte by arguing that the original and exclusive jurisdiction2 of the Supreme Court should be invoked on the basis that
the state of Wisconsin was subject to a permissive joinder. Mr.
20. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (19171);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888); Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475-476 (1793).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (2) note 23 infra.
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 notes 23-24 infra.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -(1)
citizens of different states; (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) citizens of different states
and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are
additional parties.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
25. Petroleum Exploration v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209,
217 (1937); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 27, 29
(1933); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 484 (1932); Postal TelCable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
26. 401 U.S. 493, 497 (1971).
27. 406 U.S. 91, 94 (1972).
28, 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1) note 7 supra,

29
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, rejected this contention,
30
declining to extend to merely permissive joinder the rule that
mandatory joinder is sufficient to obtain jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.3 1
Wyandotte had implicitly held that there was not an alternate
federal forum to the Supreme Court for the abatement of a public
nuisance by an aggrieved state. 32 The Illinois Court, however,
refused to be bound by this conclusion, stating that the Wyandotte
decision was "based on the preoccupation of that litigation with
public nuisance under [local] law, not the federal common law.
•..
Mr. Justice Douglas, recognizing that seventy years of federal legislation culminating in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 4 had authoritately established that it is federal policy
"to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution,"8 5 held that federal common law controls the pollution of
interstate waters.
Federal common law is established by the federal courts when
the Constitution, treaties, and statues of the United States are
silent as to the resolution of a federal question.16 An important
consideration in determining whether there is applicable federal
common law is the extent to which the area is governed by federal statutes.8 7 The Court carefully explicated the development
of federal statutory law touching interstate waters, starting with
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189938 and culminating with the recent Federal Water Pollution Control Act.3 9 Mr. Justice Douglas
held that the legislative efforts reduce the pollution of interstate
waters and the express declaration of the federal policy of protecting the rights of the states to control pollution 40 had established
a right in an aggrieved state to abate a public environmental nuisance under the federal common law.41 The federal right here in-

29. 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972).
30.

Id.

31. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 374-375 (1953).
32.
33.
34.

401 U.S. 493, 497 (1971).
406 U.S. 91, 102 n.3 (1972).
33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).

35. 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972).

36. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957);
Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296 (1941); Board of
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-350 (1939); 15A C.J.S. Common
Law 16 (1967).
37. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972); see Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (b) (1970):
Consistent with the policy declaration of this chapter, State and interstate action to abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters
shall be encouraged and shall not . .. be displaced by Federal en-

forcement action.

41. 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972).
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volved is that of a state to protect itself from environmental nuisances arising outside of its borders but affecting interstate waters.
The Court established federal law responsive to the states' "federal rights," stating that the existing statutory law did "not necessarily mark the outer bonds of the federal common law" 42 but
'43
was useful as "guidelines in fashioning such rules of decisions.
44
Although available only after a "long drawn out procedure"
a federal action for the abatement of a public nuisance in the form
of the pollution of interstate waters is an authorized remedy under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act4 5 and this statute
provides a model for abatement actions under the federal common
law. In addition, the environmental standards of the states themselves were deemed relevant by the Court, stating that "a State
with high water quality standards may well ask that its strict
standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself
to the more degrading standards of a neighbor." 46 The Court
emphasized, however, that the pollution of interstate waters is to
be controlled by federal rather than state law. 47 This federal
preemption is consistent with the Court's belief that a "uniform
rule of decision" 48 for resolution of interstate water pollution actions is necessary. The federal common law as fashioned by the
federal district courts will replace the various state laws in the
area of interstate water pollution. 49 Although the federal judges
are to act largely on their own "informed judgments," 50 uniformity is established in the sense that all actions brought in the district courts will be resolved according to the same body of fed42.

Id. at 103 n.5.

43.

Id.

44. 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (g) (1970):
If action reasonably calculated to secure abatement of the pollution within the time specified in the notice following the public
hearing is not taken, the Administrator-(1) in the case of pollution
of waters which is endangering the health or welfare of persons in
a State other than that in which the discharge or discharges
(causing or contributing to such pollution) originate, may request
the Attorney General to bring a suit on behalf of the United States
to secure abatement of pollution, and (2) in the case of pollution
of waters which is endangering the health or welfare of persons
only in the State in which the discharge or discharges (causing or
contributing to such pollution) originate, may, with the written
consent of the Governor of such State, request the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the United States to secure abatement of the pollution.
46. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).
47. Id. at 103 n.5.
48. Id. at 105 n.6.
49. Id.

50. 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972).

eral common law rather than the common and statutory laws of
the particular states involved in the action.
In Illinois5 ' the Supreme Court utilized well established principles of law to provide states with a means of enforcing their
own environmental standards when they are compatible with federal law. The Supreme Court has long recognized that it possessed the jurisdiction to adjudicate the equitable rights of states
in common waters. 52 In addition, a state may enjoin another state
from using common waters so as to create a nuisance to the citizens of the aggrieved state.5 " However, in Illinois Mr. Justice
Douglas, for the first time,'5 4 utilized these rules of law in circumstances where the citizens of one state were causing a nuisance in
another state by polluting interstate waters. The Court's novel
application of the federal common law of public nuisance pragmatically responded to the needs of the states for a forum in
which to enforce their high quality water standards when the polluting acts were committed by citizens of another state. Mr. Justice Douglas held that the District Court had original jurisdiction
of the State of Illinois' action against the City of Milwaukee as the
suit arose under the laws of the United States. 55
Even though the parties in Illinois5" were political entities, it
may be argued that the Court's reasoning would support an action
by an individual 7 in federal court for abatement of a nuisance to
his private property arising from the pollution of interstate waters. Theoretically, the action brought by the State of Illinois was
a private rather than a public nuisance action,5 8 although "public" waters were polluted. A private nuisance action is brought
by one sovereign entity or individual against another to force
abatement of a continuous non-trespassory invasion of his right to
the use and enjoyment of his property. 59 A public nuisance, however, is an offense against the state, and therefore is subject to
abatement by action of the proper government agent.60
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act 8 ' apparently recog51. Id.
52. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 562 (1962); Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 86

(1907).

53. New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473, 481-482 (1931); New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1920); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496, 520-521 (1906).
54. Although this was a novel application by the Supreme Court, the
same approach had been taken in Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1971).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) note 24 supra.
56. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
57. McMahan, The New Federal Common Law, 13 FoR THE DEFENSE
7, 84 (1972).
58. Id.
59. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, § 822 (1939).
60. Id. at Explanatory Notes Ch. 40, 217 (1939).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
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nizes this distinction and provides that under proper circumstances
an aggrieved state may petition the United States Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the United States to abate a public
nuisance arising from the pollution of interstate waters. 2 In
Illinois, however, Mr. Justice Douglas recognized that in the context of interstate water pollution the States have retained "quasisovereign interests"6 3 and that the aggrieved state may maintain
an action in federal district court for abatement of the nuisance.
In other words, the State of Illinois as sovereign owner of the
public waters within its borders, brought an action against the
City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin for abatement of its pollution of
Lake Michigan. The Illinois Court by holding that the district
court has the power to abate interstate water pollution impliedly
recognized that the action was one of private nuisance.
This distinction between private and public nuisance is significant since an individual property owner may bring an action
for abatement of a private nuisance while generally only the state
may force abatement of a public nuisance.6 4 Permitting an individual who owns property along interstate waters to seek an injunction in federal court against another individual, in another or
the same state, to abate the nuisance arising from the pollution
of the waters would provide a more effective remedy in those
states with comparatively low water pollution standards since the
federal judges are not bound by the state standards. 5 In addition, because of the great confusion among the states concerning
the term nuisance, 66 federal courts implementing federal common
law may alleviate the plight of environmental lawyers who have
had only limited success in state courts in attempts to fashion
private remedies for pollution out of the existing common law of
67
nuisance.
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee68 the Supreme Court established a cause of action, under the federal common law of nui62. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (g) note 45 supra.
63. 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972).
64. An individual may bring an action to abate a public nuisance
only if he suffers special damage to his private interests. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes Cli 40, 217 (1939).
65. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes Cl. 40, 216 (1939); In
W. PROsSER, LAw OF ToiRs 571 (4th ed. 1971) it is said that, "There is
perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance'."
67. McMahan, The New Federal Commonu Law, 13 FOR THE DEFmsrs

7, 84 (1972).

68. 406 U.S. 91 C1972).

sance, for an aggrieved state against the citizens of another state
who pollute common waters. The decision reverses the effect of
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. 0 in foreclosing the federal
courts as a forum for these suits by a state. No longer will states
with high quality water standards be without a remedy against
citizens of neighboring states with lesser standards who pollute
common waters. Theoretically, the decision allows an action in
federal district court by a private individual for abatement of a
nuisance to his land arising from the pollution of interstate waters.
Such an interpretation would provide an alternative remedy for
individuals in states which do not have adequate legislative or
judicial machinery for pollution abatement.
CHARiLES W. WATSON

69.

401 U.S. 493 (1971).

